

education to inculcate loyalty to these three freedoms. This is the heart of the responsibility of education to its community; especially its job is to guard against tyranny over beliefs and ideas, over the minds of men. Free men and free teachers are those who refuse to be coerced by arbitrary government, by a

tyrannical majority, or by a despotic minority. Free men and free teachers think for themselves, alone and with others; their goal is to keep up the free attempt to define and move toward the good and the true and the wise and to defend the right of others to engage in the same process.

The Idea of Liberty

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Three prevalent concepts of "liberty" are analyzed critically in this article: atomism or laissez-faire individualism, the social view and the cultural view.

WHILE the science of "doublethink,"¹ the logic which maintains that contradictory ideas mean absolutely the same thing, is making great headway and increasing its influence all the time, as witness the growing destruction of liberty in the name of liberty, thus far it has had only a relatively limited development. Its fuller advance lies ahead in the years to come. What it will be like then George Orwell illustrates in his novel, *1984*, in which the people of Oceania live by the abiding principle—and under the abiding tyranny—that "Freedom is Slavery."

Fortunately, 1953 still finds civilization backward enough so that no advocate of liberty, whatever the brand, will assert that his is anything but liberty pure and simple as directly opposed to slavery. If the affection for making distinctions be with us a while yet—in fact, so that it may be with us yet—a conclusion will soon have to be

reached as to which of the many diverse ideas is really the idea of liberty. The rest is doublethink. To assert in the name of freedom that any idea of it must be accepted as as good as any other is itself to doublethink. To work toward singlethink requires an examination of alternative conceptions. What follows is a consideration of a few of the ideas of liberty confronting us.

Atomism or Laissez-Faire Individualism

In this view, human individuality is given as a natural rather than a social phenomenon. The individual does not become; he is. The self or person is an independent entity whose being lies within rather than without. Defined not in terms of others, persons and things, but in terms of himself, he is a self-contained, self-sufficient unit whose reality lies in his uniqueness and separateness. Each self is a being-in-itself whose fullness of individuality is revealed only when shorn of all relations.

¹ A term used by George Orwell.

Relations are thus external to rather than constitutive of individuality.

Despite the liberty enjoyed by the natural man, there are certain things lacking in the protection of his natural rights in such a state. These rights are not grants of society but claims against it. To overcome the deficiencies of the state of nature, men enter voluntarily into a contract by which they establish society and government. Government and society are secondary existences, artificial rather than natural, unreal or lesser realities than the individual. Conveniences and means, with the individual as end, they have no status in their own right and what being and authority they have are derivative from the prior real, the individual. Since government is inherently evil, its role is restricted, largely negative and there is a separation of the moral and political realms with that government best which governs least.

Freedom is negatively conceived as freedom from restraint. Liberty is opposed to all social control and authority, to government, state, society, planning, law, order, organization. All moves in the direction of greater social control, whether of the economy or otherwise, are diminutions of liberty. Although frequently the atomistic position is expressed in terms of opposition of freedom to all authority, it is social authority rather than that of the individual that is negated. As the position logically implies, it adheres to control and authority in individualistic terms. These must not be external but must inhere in the individual himself. He is the locus of value and the source of authority and will. The only authority which he acknowledges is his

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own. Just as he is a being unto himself, so he is a law unto himself, a private ruler whose will is absolute. Each man is his own sovereign, legislator, theologian—is, in fact, as private being ultimate judge on all matters.

The self-sufficient individual of atomism is a competitive seeker of ends that are private, "man for himself," the health of whose being depends upon freedom from the infection of relations, the integer whose integrity is maintained only in isolation. Cursed rather than blest is the tie that binds men together, for these bonds are bondage. As man becomes socialized he loses freedom and individuality. He is born free and then all that is added to him takes away from him. Since freedom and individuality are identified with a lack of relations, they are at their ultimate when man stands alone, are progressively lessened as relations become more extensive, and are completely destroyed with the establishment of world community and world government. On the one hand there is the epitome of liberty, the man alone, Robinson Crusoe; on the other, the ultimate in tyranny, the leviathan of leviathans, the world state.

Criticism of Atomism

By separating the individual from his world of persons and things, atomism has in fact divorced man from himself. The result of dissociating him in order to get at his reality, the simple self, is to reduce him to nothing. The isolated entity is literally a non-entity; the in-

dividuality atomism envisions is a myth. The individual has his human being in and not outside of relations; he lives in them and only in them, and individuality and freedom exist there or not at all.

Many hold that the individual has come to count for less and less and is all but crushed at present. The way out of this situation, however, is not the restoration of the atomism which, with some retrogression, has been increasingly abandoned in recent decades even in those countries where it has had its greatest strength. That abandonment has been regarded by many as the road to serfdom, yet ironically the conception that exalted the individual and would release him to attain his fullest stature by freeing him from social institutions has been, in fact, largely responsible for his subjugation. Believing all institutions to be inherently oppressive, atomism has failed to distinguish between those that free and those that tyrannize.

Freedom cannot be found where man is pitted against man, man against the state, and one state against another. The practical meaning of atomism is not freedom but war at every level from the interpersonal to the international. It is now obvious that laissez-faire individualism must be eliminated in international affairs where annihilation is the threat of continued adherence to isolationism and national sovereignty as ultimate. It may not yet be as obvious but it is nevertheless just as true that atomism means destruction and slavery intranationally as well. There are no practical affairs that can be founded on this conception of individuality.

A Social View

Within this general position, there are several variations of which one is presented below. This position maintains that the starting point of social theory is man in society, not outside of it or in opposition to it. Human individuality is not given but comes to being through the process of socialization. The natural being is a bio-psychological entity who becomes human through his relations to such associations as the family, work groups, religious groups, and all others of which he is a member. Other individuals are not external to him as in atomism but are part of him; the self is not separate from others but constituted by them. All are one of another. Man is not an exclusive unit but is distinguishable as unique within the society of selves. It is the bond between the individual and others that makes it possible for him to develop personality and to become a free man. Individuality and liberty are attainments rather than original conditions and are achieved only within and through society.

Rights as individual are not natural as against society but are socially derived. Freedom like personality is a gift of society. The private interest is neither contrasted to nor superior to the public interest. In this sense, no individual has rights against society; his rights to be and to do are evaluated in terms of their social consequences. The public welfare cannot be overridden by a claim to a right, property or otherwise, considered private; nor is that welfare achieved by each individual seeking his own private end in his own private way. The attainment

of the good as public requires collective thought and action. Social control is essential to its achievement.

Government, authority, law, social control, society—all of these may be despotic but there is no human individuality nor freedom apart from them. Authority and control characterize every human situation and the problem of liberty is not that of overthrowing all authority and control but of finding the right kind. The choice in the social view is neither authoritarian authority nor that of laissez-faire individualism; rather freedom is to be found in democratic authority where the will of all or the social will prevails. Authority is not absolute in the individual as private nor does it lie in the hands of one or a few; instead it rests in the group as a whole. As a whole, the group is more than a sum of its parts or individuals. The same is true of the group will which as a synthesis rather than a sum is inclusive of but is more than the individual wills of the members of the group. Similarly, at a more comprehensive level, that of society considered as a group of groups, the social or the societal will incorporates but transcends the various group wills. The general will in this sense is ultimate authority within which is found the authority of groups and of individuals. When this will rules, there is freedom under law.

"Man for himself" in the social view does not mean private self-seeking but rather men acting together for their common good. Since self is also other, even while distinguishable as unique, to be for oneself is at the same time to be for others. The social concept of individuality carries with it a social

ethic: one acts with the welfare of others, of society as a consideration. Self-realization is social in nature and the fullest development of individuality and of freedom is dependent upon the fullest development of society. Government and the state have a positive role to play in this development, and authority and control socially conceived, far from being inimical to liberty, are essential to it. The social conception of individuality which holds that individual is continuous with individual, group with group, and society with society, finds the ultimate in liberty attainable only in the most inclusive whole, world society and world government.

Criticism of a Social View

Although this position asserts continuity rather than separation as principle and attempts to develop a conception of individuality which is public in character, it nevertheless falls into the error of atomism. Despite the fact that the individual is considered a reality only in groups and in society as a more inclusive group, each of these larger wholes reduces ultimately to separate individuals with their separate wills and ends. Will rests in the individual so conceived even though the social view maintains that the whole is a synthesis rather than a sum and that the public and the public will as universal are more than individuals and their wills taken together. If the will that inheres in the individual is not absolute in this position as it is in atomism, the public will, nevertheless, is composed of such wills. That individual wills become or may become modified through interaction with others so that the outcome

is a new will does not alter the fact that the seat of will remains the same as in atomism. The quality of the will that emerges has not changed but is of the same nature as its source. Universality, wholeness, unity are not attained by a synthesis as long as social will is composed of these same elements.

The public will is neither an aggregate nor a synthesis of private wills. Will does not become objective on the basis of inclusiveness if that refers to number, nor on the basis of agreement even when qualification is made as to the method by which this agreement is attained. The conception of will in the social view does not overcome the defects of atomism and therefore remains subjective. Liberty cannot be founded upon subjective will.

A Cultural View

Both the atomistic and the social positions take essentially the same approach to the problem of freedom. The question which both consider as the crucial one to be answered is that of *whose* will shall prevail. Although they disagree on the answer, they agree on the nature of the question. The cultural view differs from these two views not in that it gives still another reply to this question but in that it rejects the question itself as disastrous for freedom. The question implies that authority is personal rather than impersonal and that the problem of freedom is to find the person or persons in whom authority rests. But personal authority, the cultural view argues, is inherently arbitrary and tyrannical whether it be vested in one person or in many. Whatever the answer given to this question, the will involved is nec-

essarily subjective, and as such means subjection.

According to the cultural position, the problem of freedom is not one of determining whose will shall prevail whether it be one, few, many, or all, nor is it that of finding a qualitative "who." Instead of asking "who shall rule?" or "whose will shall be law?" the cultural view asks "what is law?" "Who" questions must be abandoned in favor of "what" questions if there is to be any conception of will that identifies with freedom. Authority speaks with nobody's voice but is impersonal. The authority of the teacher, doctor, lawyer, clergyman does not reside in their persons nor is it a delegation made by other persons or by society as a whole of persons; rather it inheres in the institution and is cultural in nature. The authority of the teacher is derived from the nature of education and its place as an institution within the whole of institutions, as a particular good within the whole good.

Similarly, will as institutional is public and objective in nature. What the teacher wills as teacher is education; her will is one with it. As teacher-person she is realized as education is realized. Considered as whole person, what she wills is the whole of culture: art, religion, action in all its forms, the institutional whole, the good life. She is realized as person or individual through and in institutions. Since the self is not a thing-in-itself but is continuous with the world, since institutions are the "other" that are the person, the fullness of individuality is attained only in the fullness of culture. Man is free when culture is all that it can be.

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