GROWING social consciousness in recent years has prodded American secondary schools to conceive and deliver humanities programs with passionate zeal and reckless abandon. Many of these new programs direct themselves toward major societal crises of the day: poverty, human rights, culture lag, generation gaps, youth unrest, pollution, and imminent world destruction.

In their goals, the new programs are in the tradition of humanities programs throughout history. Unfortunately, there is little evidence in the past history or the present disposition of humanities programs to generate much confidence in them as salutary agents of the human condition.

Sadly enough, the prime contributing factors to the ineffectiveness of humanities programs appear to be these: (a) the nature of the humanities as a field of study, and (b) the stubborn insistence of humanities scholars and educators upon polarization rather than cooperation.

Glatthorn illustrates the magnitude of the problem by citing some polarities of attitudes and positions which obfuscate the most propitious use of the humanities for school programs: Are they best learned as separate disciplines or as integrated studies? Should humanities programs direct students to the timeless or the timely problems and achievements of man? Should the programs give greater emphasis to the cognitive or the affective domain? Would the humanities best be served by national curriculum projects or by local grass-roots efforts? 1

Analyses of polarizations in the humanities are varied. Crane and Else identify the controversy as one between the "ancients" and the "moderns." The ancients maintain that the Greek and Roman classics are the humanities. The moderns include all literature and language. 2 Ong draws the line of demarcation between (a) the humanities in the restricted sense as man's creative or imaginative works, and (b) the humanities in the larger sense as man's relationship to the entire human life world. 3

Offering yet another viewpoint, Ackerman notes that those people who are concerned with political and social involvement are demanding a radical change of posture in the humanist and an alteration of existing institutions. They counter the wishes of others who seek to preserve the past role of the humanist with slight alterations. Those


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alterations include that of bringing humanistic thinking to bear sympathetically upon the present condition of man, but essentially within the framework of existing institutions and academic points of view.4

Effect of Polarization

If scholars were to cluster near a restricted concept of the humanities, the task of determining a design for humanities programs in the schools would be a rather simple, mechanical process of selecting and organizing content from among specifiable subject matter. As it is, however, most scholars shy away from restricted categories, preferring "... to gather under the umbrella of humane studies all the disciplines that seek an understanding of man." 5

The varied attitudes and positions exhibited by scholars appear to have had a contagious effect upon the planning of humanities programs in the schools. A possible symptom of contagion may be the predilection of many educators to propagate humanities programs with little or no consideration of direction and goal. Refusing to let ambiguity interfere with the progress of their curriculum plans, they rhapsodize over an idea whose content has yet to be defined.6

A possible result of their unbridled enthusiasm may be the kaleidoscope of humanities programs existent in public schools across the nation. Wilhelms, for example, states that in 1967, approximately 500 humanities programs on the high school level were identifiable, but that by now at least 5,000 are in operation.7 Several studies conducted in recent years lend support to Wilhelms' statement by pointing out the lush variety of humanities programs found in secondary education alone.8

While the zeal of the humanities proponents continues to multiply programs at an exponential rate, words of caution also abound. Both Broudy and Taba have reminded educators that program development in American public schools is a luxuriant rather than a systematic growth. The result has been a curriculum characterized by Taba as "... the amorphous product of generations of tinkerings." 9 As with other components of

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the curriculum, Broudy warns, the future of humanities programs may well be jeopardized unless guiding principles ensure their proper development. 11 Eisner further advises that a commitment to the values attributed to the humanities is an act much simpler to generate than the task of identifying worthy content in the humanities or conceptualizing methods of inquiry which will validate selected content. 11

The omnibus syndrome which pervades the humanities and humanities programs is referred to by scholars as a "crisis." Yet, in perfect step with the general aura of uncertainty pervading the humanities as a field of study, scholars do not agree upon the nature of the crisis. Curriculum planners, therefore, find themselves confronted with another complexity. Disagreement concerning what constitutes the humanities is one problem. The proclivity of educators to develop and promote humanities programs with little or no direction is another. When scholars and educators dispute the causes of the crisis, however, the task of clarifying the nature of the humanities and humanities programs becomes unmanageable.

Bush believes that the plight of the humanities is not the result of any internal weakness. Rather, civilization has accelerated the means for spreading the disease of ignorance in heart and mind at a rate faster than the humanities have been able to prevent or cure the disease. 12 Prior would concur in part with Bush's analysis. He points out that as science and technology have advanced in achievement and importance, the humanities correspondingly have lagged. He would not, however, label science and technology as forces which stultify the heart and mind. 13 Beardsley, on the other hand, attributes the crisis to the rise of the social sciences and psychology to a scientific and professional status. Their rise has disputed the traditional claim of the humanities to provide the most significant and fundamental understanding of human nature. 14 Still others assign the crisis of the humanities either to general inconsistencies in the concept of the humanities as a field of study, or to a predisposition on the part of humanities scholars to resist majority determination under the banner of "academic freedom."

These latter two analyses of the crisis are those treated most frequently in the literature. Each of them in part signifies the spirit of individual thought which has come to be associated with scholars of the humanities. While Brubacher and Broudy laud diversity of thought as academically rewarding and individually stimulating, they also point out that diversity can have many faces. Frequently a passion and support for individual freedom of thought is a self-protective device which conceals an insecurity about one's own preferences. On the other hand, differences are often alleged to be more diffuse than they actually are. Yet if diversity, whether real or alleged, is so pervasive that it persistently blocks all efforts to establish common areas of agreement, it is of little value to those who must plan school programs. 15

Discerning some semblance of unity in the variability of thought concerning the humanities and humanities programs is in keeping with a recommendation of the Commission on the Humanities in the Schools. The Commission asserts that educational agencies must demonstrate what the humanities are, why they should be studied, which kinds of teaching are needed to enhance the value of the study of the humanities, and what the objectives of that teaching should be. 10 This

11 Eisner, loc. cit.
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recommendation can be heeded only when curriculum planners know the problems they face in developing humanities programs, and the causes of those problems.

Although they have maintained a distinct popularity in the Western world for centuries, the humanities have never been able to project an image consistently or particularly distinct from other areas of study.

To the early Greeks, the humanities represented a mood, evidenced by the manner in which man lived his life. Behaving humanely was the essential component of the mood. Through Cicero and his contemporaries, the Romans expanded the Greek concept to include not only humane feelings and one’s conduct toward others, but also the virtues of gentleness, consideration, competence, responsibility, social utility, and good manners.

Throughout the 1st century, the concept of the humanities existed as an intent in the mind of man to establish his own dignity and that of other men. It remained for Quintilian to formalize the concept to include not only the ideal of a gentleman, but also the intellectual cultivation and training employed to produce the ideal. The training consisted primarily of the study of the language, literature, philosophy, history, and oratory of Greece and Rome. For Quintilian, the humanities served a very practical purpose. The most prestigious role or characteristic of a gentleman was that of oratory. It was “speech” that distinguished man from the animals; and reason was worthless unless it could be communicated. Those arts and subject matters, therefore, which best suited the formation of the orator constituted the humanities.17

Renaissance scholars reincarnated Quintilian’s concept of the humanities. Their discovery of and encounter with texts which had been put aside during the medieval period spurred them to devote themselves eagerly to a study of the past, its religion, philosophy, art, science, and social organization. Greek and Latin literature again came to be valued as the great sources of knowledge, wisdom, and eloquence. These disciplines were to maintain within the curriculum a virtual monopoly which was not really broken before the middle of the 19th century. Like their Roman predecessors, Renaissance scholars stressed functional learning. The goal was to produce well-rounded, well-informed, polished gentlemen of the world. 1

The humanistic school of the Renaissance, however, quickly degenerated from its lofty goal of learning how to live by the classics into mere drill on Latin style. Moreover, the pragmatic philosophy of a world bent on industrialization allocated greater stock to learning which was, to paraphrase Franklin, useful rather than merely ornamental. This reaction against the humanistic curriculum was not a new phenomenon. Even in Hellenistic times, the Greek classics were challenged in popularity by the common literature of those days. It is quite possible, in fact, that the older works would have been obliterated had it not been for the demands of formal education and the professions of law, rhetoric, and politics. 19

The humanities’ lack of popularity among the masses was understandable, for despite the inference of its title, the humanistic curriculum was not favorable to the common man nor concerned with his welfare. Cicero illustrated the aristocratic flavor of the humanities in his day and the general disdain held for the common man:

Public opinion divides the trades and professions into the liberal and the vulgar. We condemn the odious occupation of the collector of customs and the usurer, and the base and menial work of unskilled laborers; for the very wages the laborer receives are a badge of slavery. ... The work of the mechanic is also degrading; there is nothing noble about a workshop. The least respectable of all trades are those which minister to pleasure, as Terence tells us, “fishmongers, butchers, cooks, sausage-makers.” Add to these, if you like, perfumers, dancers, and the actors of the “ludus talarius.” 20

From the 17th to the 19th centuries, Brubacher claims, the very survival of the humanistic curriculum in American education can be attributed to the fact that, while people had little regard for the formalized curriculum or it for them, they nevertheless prized its badge of class distinction. 21

Within the past one hundred years, scholars have superimposed a new configuration of meanings upon past concepts of the humanities. The new meanings are primarily those which oppose the increasing emphasis upon science and technology and the social ills they supposedly breed. This attempt at flexibility has not been noticeably successful. Torn by divisive efforts to adapt to a pragmatic curriculum yet maintain their status character, the humanities have become a marketplace in which a variety of educational salesmen set up store. 22 This catch-all syndrome may have inspired Frost to define the humanities as “... everything human that has been brought to book and can be treated in poetry—philosophy, politics, religion, history, and science. Everything, everything...” 23

The efforts of other men to delimit the scope of the humanities to studies centering attention upon the life of man had an effect counter to that intended. The claim did not distinguish the humanities from biology, for example, for man is a life form. Neither did the claim isolate the humanities from the


21 Brubacher, op. cit., p. 425.

22 Schuyler, loc. cit.

social sciences, if one accepts Aristotle's premise that man is a political animal, nor from religion if, as Edmund Burke proposed, man is a religious animal. 24

An inevitable result of granting the humanities a wide berth of meanings is that today almost anyone can and does claim to be a humanist:

Especially today, a humanist can be a theologian trying to do without a personal God, an educational reformer who thinks man has too much of natural science and not enough of the humanities, a philosopher who holds that humans are rather more than animals if less than gods, and no doubt much else. 25

Maslow and Bruner, for example, offer themselves as humanistic psychologists, Riessman as a humanistic sociologist, Huxley as a humanistic biologist, and Garn as a humanistic geneticist. 26 Gillin states that some anthropologists insist that they are humanists, not social scientists, because they look at culture in historical perspective and as a total, functioning configuration. 27

When the humanities are determined by what it is humanists or other scholars do, Prior notes, the distinctions become unmanageable. The variables and vagaries of human nature and individual temperament defy definitions of this type. It is one thing to claim that the humanities possess certain latent powers and quite another to claim either that those who are exposed to the humanities will always possess those powers or that anyone who does possess those powers is automatically a humanist. There is never a perfect equivalence between the potential formative influence of a particular discipline and the individuals who do or do not come under its influence. 28

24 Encyclopaedia Britannica, loc. cit.
Another cause for diversity within the humanities has been the historical wont of humanists to view as a violation of individual and academic integrity any attempt to channel either their thoughts or the context of humanities programs into a consensus of beliefs. At a meeting of the American Council of Learned Societies, Leo Steinberg exclaimed that he was delighted to know that the meeting would disband without any subscription to joint policy. Humanists would not be humanists, he asserted, if they committed themselves to a concerted program of action.

A respect and recognition for human diversity has been an essential characteristic of the humanist. The historical right and duty of every responsible thinker, Greene claimed, has been the pursuit of his inquiries in his own way and the assessment of human life and its complex environment without social threat or coercion. Unity amid diversity is the only true unity prized by humanists.

Brinton is in substantive agreement with Greene's characterization of the humanist scholar, but in somewhat harsher tones. In reference primarily to Renaissance times, Brinton states that humanists, though they are great individualists who want to be themselves, are not quite clear about what to make of themselves. Moreover, humanist scholars have not been the great advocates of democracy as is popularly acceded to them. They have been "... a privileged group of learned men, very proud of their scholarly standards, with most of the traditional defects of scholars—vanity, possessiveness, quarrelsomeness, and a great fear of making mistakes."

Avoidance of mutual agreements has also been advocated on the grounds that consensus represents either pooled ignorance or forced conclusions. In 1927, Bode claimed that decision making on the basis of consensus has become a habit with educators. When puzzled by a problem, educators consult others who are equally puzzled or who, perhaps, have not reflected upon the problem at all. A solution is then evoked out of collective ignorance.

In their report of a national conference on the arts, Murphy and Glass state that conferees, while recognizing the desirability of achieving consensus concerning a definition of the "arts," found the task inconvenient and decided, therefore, to proceed without it. The conferees waived consensus in order not "... to consume precious meeting time by grappling with definitions."

To this point, Prior might argue that in attempts to contrast the humanities with the sciences, for example, such distinctions can be taken for granted as part of an individual's general qualifications for following the argument, or that the distinctions will emerge by implication. He adds, however, that:

During the course of any extended debate ... distinctions become blurred, and under the stress of argument issues are shifted and nuances disappear. It becomes necessary now and again to reconsider what it is we are talking about.

The individualistic spirit which has characterized humanities scholarship has carried over to the development of humani-

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31 Crane Brinton, op. cit., p. 27.
ties programs in the schools. The spirit, known as the "grass-roots" philosophy of curriculum development, finds great acceptance and use among planners of humanities programs. A tenet of this philosophy holds that the particular needs and demands of individual school systems, schools, or classrooms completely determine the shape of the curriculum. The tenet also aligns itself with a popular crusade of today, namely, that a "relevant" curriculum is an "immediate" curriculum designed to service the demands and interests of the moment.

Keller affirms that the humanities movement is a grass-roots movement and that it should remain so. Courses should have no predetermined pattern, but should grow out of the interests and abilities of teachers and students. In the same context, Stocking claims that there is no such thing as an ideal course in the humanities. The New York State Department of Education indicates that the "... structure of humanities courses has always been extremely varied and, let us be thankful, shows every sign of remaining extremely varied." 36

It is interesting to note, however, that Keller lauds humanities programs which indicate somewhat definite patterns, such as "The Humanities in Three Cities" Program. He also suggests specific undertakings he would promote in a course: use Plato's Apology, Sophocles' Antigone, Shaw's Saint Joan, Bolt's A Man for All Seasons, Brecht's Galileo, Miller's The Crucible; then move on to a study of the cathedrals at Chartres and Coventry; to that add a study of Picasso's "Guernica," Albee's Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?, and Britten's "War Requiem." In an earlier article, Keller also stated that he would rather see each discipline of the humanities taught

well than a humanities course which is blurred and fuzzy through attempts to cover too much.\footnote{35}

While the pertinence of grass-roots curriculum planning might be defended somewhat in this age when social consciousness is paramount, an underlying fallacy might be detected in its unquestioning promotion. A humanities program founded on the individualistic beliefs of schools or teachers may well be a popular program. Yet popularity carries with it no guarantee of quality. Granted, consensus of beliefs does not guarantee quality either. The odds for success, however, would seem more favorable when based upon majority determination rather than upon individual preference. At the very least, the greater the agreement upon a program of action, the greater the confidence that can be placed in the program’s success.\footnote{38}

Dahl claims that an attractive feature of humanities education is the absence of so-called experts in the field.\footnote{39} Broudy indirectly chides Dahl by pointing out the consequences of non-expertise. If no one is an expert in determining the design of humanities programs, an extended conclusion might be, in consideration of the infinite variability among men as to what knowledge is of most worth, that it does not really matter then what is taught or how it is taught.\footnote{40}

There appears to be, however, obvious concern for what is taught in the schools. Hart states that parents in the world of business, industry, science, technology, and the professions are pressuring for answers from schools for what is considered ineffective education. These “new critics,” as Hart calls them, are shocked to find each teacher, specialist, or administrator constantly making decisions with little recourse to research, established findings, verification, or the checking of results in meaningful ways. School people often seem not to care whether what they are doing is the best practice so long as it suits their convenience and preferences. Schools operate in a state of near-anarchy with teachers “owning” their classes and doing what they please within them. “To suppose that such a disjointed, unsteered, diffuse organization can respond to complex and urgent needs of the day seems to the layman purest madness.”\footnote{41}

Two major issues, then, appear to generate confusion about the humanities and humanities programs: (a) scholars and their passion for individuality, and (b) inconsistencies in man’s concepts of the humanities. Billington claims that university faculties must bear a deep responsibility for the confusion. Commercialism, competition, and compartmentalization have detoured universities from cultivating the quest for order and beauty through exposure to other men’s accomplishments to the training of task-oriented technicians. Through a subtle corruption of humanistic scholarship, faculties have created a new breed of humanists. The new breed is composed of:

1. Those who identify the humanities inextricably with the ideal of a natural and remote aristocracy. Booth claims that this group snobbishly divides the world into “humanists” and “othermen.”\footnote{42}

2. A second group prefers to imitate Aristotle as counselor to Alexander the Great. The members nourish a cult of perpetual political involvement, distinguishing themselves as “action intellectuals” or “voyeurs of power.” Often they are little more than makeup men who tidy up a political figure’s image or programs for public presentation.

3. The third and final group in Billington’s categorization of humanists consists of the “surrender-ists.” Engulfed by the glamour of science, this group has developed an inferiority complex and a despair in dealing with qualitative problems such as values.

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item[\footnote{36}] Harry S. Broudy, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 26.
\item[\footnote{38}] Broudy, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 25.
\end{itemize}}
tastes, or beliefs. They have surrendered to
the cult that believes that the things which
count are only those which can be counted.43

Today, therefore, the humanities chal-
lenge efforts to define them or to specify their
content and processes. Consequently, hu-
manities programs in the schools generally
suffer from a lack of any clear direction.

In summary, the spirit of individualism
and grass-roots curriculum planning imbues
the literature with a plethora of opinions,
beliefs, and convictions regarding the best
humanities programs for American second-
dary school education. Definitions of the
humanities consequently are as numerous
and varied as the scholars and educators
who support them. The objectives of humani-
ties programs, when considered in totality,
promise to produce students who are aesthet-
ically sensitive to beauty, critics of art prod-
ucts and human values, erudite members in
the world of scholarship, and stable, com-
passionate, knowledgeable interpreters and
custodians of world order. Processes for hu-
manities programs run the gamut from that
of reading great classics to visiting museums
and traveling abroad.

In general, the approach appears to be
markedly different from current develop-
ments in other subject fields. Scientists and
mathematicians, for example, through pro-
grams such as BSCS and SMSG seem to be
seeking the best design and method through
which students can become biologists, mathe-
maticians, or knowledgeable laymen in those
fields. Foreign language specialists in gen-
eral have agreed upon the audio-lingual ap-
proach as the most beneficial program for
language students.

While workers in those subject fields
seek strength through unity, devotees of the
humanities programs apparently boast that
their strength lies in diversity. Parker, in la-
menting the split of humanistic study into
organizations such as the American Philo-
logical Association, Modern Language Asso-
ciation, National Council of Teachers of

English, College English Association, and
many more, believes that the results far too
often include indifference to common prob-
lems, a spirit of competition rather than cooperation, a further fragmentation of
knowledge, and a prestige-seeking interfer-
ence with the search for a liberal education.
In fact, as interest in the humanities has
increased, departmentalization of interest
has also increased.44

Perhaps a relationship can be drawn
between Parker's analysis of the fragmenta-
tion of humanities organizations and the frag-
mentation syndrome of humanities programs
throughout the nation. These programs,
following the lead of those who advocate grass-
roots planning, seem to relate unity of
purpose and approach with a lack of creativ-
ity, apparently missing the point that it is
the student of a humanities program whose
creativity is to be elicited primarily, and not
the creativity of program planners.

Humanities programs in American sec-
ondary education have been advocated as
possible contributors to the task of improving
the human condition. Thus far, however,
their shortcomings have far outweighed their
successes. It has been found, for example,
that the very existence and continuation of
many programs have depended upon the
charismatic leadership of individual teachers.
When such leaders have moved to other posi-
tions, they have left no structural programs
for others to pursue.

Also lamentable has been the fact that
many existent programs lay primary empha-
sis upon the attainment of cognitive skills,
with almost total disregard of affective qualities. The potential value of humanities pro-
grams, however, has been most seriously
cripped by a rash of individualistic and
fragmented efforts. As a result, many pro-
grams have been little more than loosely-
planned "courses," plugged into, but not
coordinated with, total school curricula. In
that lack of coordination may lie the basic
weakness of humanities programs in Ameri-
can secondary schools.

43 James H. Billington. "The Humanistic
Heartbeat Has Failed." Life 64: 32-35; May 24,
1968.

44 William Riley Parker. The Language Cur-
tain. New York: Modern Language Association of