Differentiating Affective Concerns

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I teach a large graduate class in curriculum. Teachers and administrators who take the course, as well as invited speakers, often call for more affective learnings in school. Both this call for personal-social input into educational programs and the more humane concerns reflected in the literature of the past five years have become quite absorbing. Many writers are addressing themselves to it.¹

It seems to me that there is much confusion in these advocations about problems that are not directly of a curriculum and instructional nature and those that are. The advocates of dealing with humane and affective concerns frequently attack on all fronts and most often without resolutions that might lead to specific changes. When some apparent changes in practices are revealed, they are quite temporal. Some analysis of this dilemma would appear to be in order so that our roles and functions might become clarified. This can offer hope for some long-range solutions.

The confusion seems to focus on a disparity between directions of the concerns.

¹Impetus for this writing is the result of a taped dialogue with Harry S. Broudy, Professor of Philosophy of Education, University of Illinois, March 1971.

²To cite but a few: Norman Newberg and Mark R. Shedd in the latest yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, The Curriculum: Retrospect and Prospect, Part I. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971; the writings of Paul Goodman, John Holt, Edgar Friedenberg, Mario Fantini, and Gerald Weinstein. Some are directed toward the conditions for learnings. Youngsters are hungry or sleepy or drugged and are poor subjects for any school-associated learnings, as a result. Some concerns are directed to an overemphasis upon adult expectations in learnings associated with a disciplinary curriculum. The call here appears to be to lessen such expectations in favor of more personal-social inputs into the curriculum. Last, we see concerns about inhumane instruction. Teachers fail to see youth as people and either do not teach for or fail to create environments that allow for adequate respect or motivation to learn.

These concerns have commonality in their aspects of humaneness and personal foci. However, they also depart in terms of who must address themselves to them.

Many of the concerns are not directly related to school programs. Some who advocate more humane concerns for children and youth reveal the necessity to cope with students who suffer from conditions that retard their attention-giving to life in a classroom. The conditions refer to fear of or absorption with gangs on the street (that may or may not be in evidence within a school building), addiction to drugs, lack of sleep or nourishment, and emotional problems that may emanate from home and family situations.

Now one can argue that education, even

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formal education, is a necessary requirement as a long-range step to cope with gang warfare and drugs. However, it is most ostrich-like for one to think that he can alleviate such conditions in the immediate future so as greatly to diminish such problems in the minds of learners where these problems exist. As educational programs go, in terms of likely attainability for the here and now, one is hard pressed to think that schooling can be addressed to their solutions where they result in lessened conditions for learning.

It is also difficult to see how curriculum and/or instruction offer solutions for students deprived of sleep, food, or the emotional strength to function in daily activity. This does not necessarily imply that they should not be concerns for school personnel. However, to be affectively oriented toward a student in such cases may have much more meaning in terms of securing federal money for free lunches or consulting with a parent about home conditions than in terms of looking for solutions through curriculum and instruction. The major point here is that the schools have been poorly equipped to deal with affective concerns in terms of any prompt solutions to serious problems.

The curriculum can help in terms of dealing with gangs—but it will not necessarily halt the gang problem and its deleterious effect on children and youth. The same applies to drugs. It may be quite sadistic on the part of a teacher to be harsh to a student who is unable to be attentive due to a home-related problem. Yet to be humane, in such cases, does little to alleviate the problem and, hence, improve the conditions for learning.

Those who seek more personal-social input into the curriculum are really vying with two highly influential forces. One is the traditional concern for the disciplines as a major input, a movement that has seen renewed vigor through the reforms of the 1950's and 1960's. It has a time-honored base in that it represents the cultural heritage
of a given society, in particular, and advances in civilization, in general.

The other is the behavior modification movement, which is represented by the more recent advances in technology, the behavioral objectives boom, and the accountability deluge evidenced in the desire for performance contracts. The fact that the humane people are vying with two potent camps is initially forwarded not as a new fact but as a consideration to which they have failed to address themselves. They must not only begin to recognize the differentiations that form the theme of this writing, but should also face more squarely the consequences of deciding what they will specifically do without, and why, in competing for time in educational programs. It is not enough to say, "We can cut out some of the traditional subjects and skills."

One argument going for them is evidenced in a recent historical piece by Kliebard. He attacks the behavior modification movement in terms of its use of the corporate, efficiency model of the business world. Furthermore, schooling, he says, suffers from using a model that is not adaptable to goals for educating children and youth as much as for training them.

What are some feasible curriculum inputs that the personal-social camp can opt for? One form would be small group enterprises that focus upon personal and social concerns of students. Another is a course that specifically deals with race relations and prejudice. A third is drugs and narcotics. A fourth is sex education. And so forth. The list is potentially a long one and is summarized by three features that differentiate it from the other two competing forces. They focus on:

1. Attitudes and values
2. More student input (less adult expectation)
3. Interdisciplinary or guidance efforts.

These conclusions do not necessarily reflect the romantic aspirations of many of those with humane concerns. (As a matter of fact, one is correct in noting that I accuse many of those with good intentions of failing to think out just what it is that they are about.)

Another way of summing up the curriculum input desired by those with affective concerns is that they believe it imperative to help youngsters today see themselves, other people, and institutions as schools have never before attempted to do.

Affectively concerned persons are probably most concerned about the ways in which teachers have received and acted out their roles. The goals for teachers might run as follows:

1. Like and respect children and youth
2. Not be coercive or punitive with youngsters
3. Concentrate on aiding learners in being better motivated to learn—even learn more in terms of what the learners wish to learn
4. Develop and implement more local (even individual teacher-class) curriculum that will utilize value and attitude learnings.

In this arena there is little new that has not been advocated (really exhorted) over a half-century of teacher education. There are few who dispute such statements and their related slogans. However, in all fairness to the existing situation, the failure to have realized on such statements would seem to require less fault-finding and guilt-placing than to inquire about the reasons for not attaining more humane teachers. I do not think it is enough merely to blame an impersonal "system."

In any event, such is the distinction that appears to separate the affective concerns here from those that deal with the conditions for learning and the curriculum. Are these

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3 These movements, viewed as inputs into educational programs, were neatly classified as personal, social, systems approaches, and information processing in a taped dialogue with Bruce Joyce, Professor of Education, Teachers College, Columbia University, February 1971. This author took prerogatives in simplifying them as three inputs, namely, personal-social, behavior modification, and disciplinary curriculum reforms.

concerns in some ways related? Of course. Yet they are also separable and, in this regard, it becomes plausible to seek some conclusions and implications.

**Impetus for Change**

Most of the problems associated with the conditions for learning are not school controlled and cannot be resolved without societal action. Law enforcement must control drug traffic and gang violence. At best, the school can cooperate in these efforts. If educators continue to sell the old game of schools' solving such problems, these problems will go unsolved unless the society recognizes this ego-centered view of educators and refuses to heed those of our romantic notions that do disservice to children and youth. The affective, humanistic camp has not aided us toward solutions in the area of conditions for learning much beyond the pressure exerted for school lunch programs.

In terms of curriculum concerns, the humanistic group should receive support for thought-out reexamination. The onus is on the personal-social people to be clearer in their goals and to recognize that they cannot and should not expect a turnover without clear notions of what can be altered in what may well be a monolithic set of school offerings. The affective people are justified in desires to provide settings for process-oriented, personal-social programs that serve guidance functions, and they have some reason on their side for both their and student input into determining and developing this phase of the school's curriculum. Where such efforts require interdisciplinary developmental tasks, they need to be joined by those who are more concerned about substance, or the curriculum developed is likely to be weaker, temporal, and lose impetus for change.

For both curriculum and instructional components, changes are less likely without recognizing the need to rethink and revise teacher preparation and in-service education programs. On the other hand, caution is needed in such reexamination. If we are to teach teachers to deal more with values and attitudes, the question of which values raises its ugly head again. The risk of indoctrination comes into play here and, while the risk may be well worth taking, it is fraught with danger. When the goal becomes one of turning over an established system, we need to take care that we are not moving toward one that may be more dictatorial than the one we wish to replace. Who has the corner on good values and attitudes, and when do such judgments, when idiosyncratic, prove better than those represented by societal norms?

The affective concerns that relate to emotional well-being often are based on the implicit assumption that teachers are therapists. At this point in time, they are not (nor are most of those who make the assumption). At this point in time, without a new teacher preparation (which may or may not be an attainable one) we might best argue for more school psychiatrists or cooperation from other agencies. Much as this latter point may infuriate the personal-social camp, what is the alternative?

This examination has led to raising the question, once again, about what schools can and cannot do. I tried to examine this in a 1967 writing. Many of the questions and issues are still relevant, though I admit to oversimplification for the present era. However, until school and broader educational priorities are reexamined, many of the present dilemmas, including the affective arguments, will be difficult to resolve. Glatthorn and I will propose such a solution in a work to be released in 1972,

