No one would argue that every child in the United States deserves a high-quality educator, but the reality is that too many U.S. classrooms, schools, and districts struggle to attract the best and brightest teachers and leaders. A recent article by Claudia Wallis (2008) in Time
places the national average starting salary for teachers at $32,000. Richard Ingersoll (2003) reports that one-third of all new teachers leave the profession within three years, and almost one-half leave within five years, often due to poor working conditions and low salaries. Senator Edward Kennedy (2007), in introducing legislation addressing teacher issues, indicates that, especially in high-poverty schools, many children are taught by teachers who lack a college major in the subject they teach. In fact, 70 percent of math classes in high-poverty middle schools are taught by teachers without even a minor in math. Knowing that there is a direct link between great educators and students who graduate ready for success in postsecondary education, the workforce, and life, should we be surprised that the reality of the situation described above leads to diminishing returns?
Businesses and private sector entities commonly implement merit pay, performance incentives, and bonus programs. In sales and finance, for example, employees can earn additional compensation (quite substantial in some cases) beyond a standard salary based on employee effectiveness and the achievement of certain goals. In some cases, all employees share the rewards; in other cases, the rewards are individually determined. The structure and sizes of the rewards vary as well, with some based on quarterly sales, some on individual goals, and others on meeting multiple indicators. Such approaches have proven effective in attracting and retaining qualified personnel and in rewarding high-performing employees.
In education, however, the mere mention of these approaches causes significant controversy. Are merit and incentive pay programs possible for educators? We know high-performing teachers and administrators are critical to student success, but the issue is whether these financial arrangements can be used fairly in schools to help retain key personnel while improving student achievement.
Addressing Student Achievement
As with any innovation or program in education, a fundamental question must be addressed: Does the program improve student achievement? Several studies support ASCD's belief that potential benefits can accrue from the development and use of merit and incentive pay programs.
A recent national study conducted by Figlio and Kenny (2007) found that student scores increased on assessments where incentive pay programs were in place for teachers, in comparison to peer scores at schools where teacher salaries were more uniform. Published in the
Journal of Public Economics, the study found evidence of higher test scores in public and private schools where incentives were offered, especially in schools that served high proportions of low-income families and in schools that were more selective in awarding pay incentives. According to the researchers, "doling out merit pay to most teachers provides them with little incentive to do a better job," and the evidence suggests that "there is a relation between test scores and merit pay targeted to few but no association between student performance and indiscriminate merit pay" (p. 913). Debra Viadero's review of the study for Education Week cites the limitations conceded by the authors—that the data set was not ideal and that without conducting an experiment it cannot be ruled out that the schools offering incentives were better from the outset than the ones that did not—and highlights the sentiment expressed by other experts in the field that the data will "improve as teacher incentive programs become more widespread" (p. 8).
Another study, conducted on a smaller level by Barnett, Ritter, Winters, and Greene at the Department of Education Reform at the University of Arkansas (2007), reveals similar results. The study examined student achievement in the Little Rock Public School District, comparing two elementary schools with a merit pay program in place under the Arkansas Achievement Challenge Pilot Project with three elementary schools without such a program. The schools had similar demographic and achievement baselines, and all were high-poverty schools as determined by the free and reduced-priced lunch program. The Arkansas Achievement Challenge Pilot Project provides bonuses based on individual student achievement and improvement as measured by assessments in the fall and spring. Teachers in the program get a bonus ranging from $50 to $400 per student based on improvement on the assessments. Teachers and other eligible school employees agreed to the project's participation terms and payout structure. Addressing the possibility that merit pay programs could be used to deal with Arkansas' teacher quality dilemma, the study's authors concluded that "based on the findings from the first year evaluation of the Achievement Challenge Pilot Project, the future of merit pay is promising. Student performance improved in schools where the program operated" (p. 13).
A 2006 review by Podgursky and Springer for the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) details nine studies addressing the impact of teacher incentive programs on student achievement. The studies date back as far as 1991 and examine schools in the United States, India, Kenya, Israel, and the United Kingdom. On the question of improving student achievement, seven of the studies found positive results relating to incentive programs. Results from the other two studies were mixed.
Questions and Answers
One of the complaints about individual rewards and incentives is that merit pay would undermine the team concept behind teaching. The National Education Association, one of the most vocal opponents of merit pay, states: "We remain opposed to pay systems that directly link teacher compensation to student test scores. Such merit pay systems fail to recognize that teaching is not an individual, isolated profession. Rather, it is a profession dependent on the entire network of teaching professionals, where the foundation for student achievement is built over time from each of the student's educators. Further merit pay undermines the collegiality and teamwork that create a high-performing learning institution" (2006, p. 24).
ASCD believes that flexibility in the design of merit pay programs can address this argument. According to NCPI's review by Podgursky and Springer (2006), flexible merit pay programs can work if they are based on mutual monitoring and increased cooperation and communication. For example, the New York City School District recently proposed a plan that would give cash bonuses to teachers in 200 of the district's more than 1,400 schools. The school system would award a bonus—divided among the entire school staff—for student achievement gains demonstrated and documented almost entirely by increased test scores. A committee comprising the principal, another administrator, and two teachers would determine how staff members would share in the bonus award. Illustrating that union participation is critical to the success of such programs, the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), which opposes rewarding individual teachers on the basis of test scores, supports this plan because it shares the reward with the whole school (Honawar, 2007).
The National Education Association, like the UFT and others, raises concerns about basing entire bonuses for educators on a single test. When workers have multiple tasks, some quantifiable and some not, they tend to focus on those for which they are measured, especially if a bonus is involved (Podgursky & Springer, 2006). When a bonus is dependent on student results on a single test, there is the danger that educators will teach to that test. Tying teacher performance to student results on one test could even lead to fraudulent behaviors such as helping students with the test, misidentification of students, or inappropriate placement of students into special education courses (Podgursky & Springer, 2006).
Obviously, teaching to the test is not the intention of a merit-based system, nor is it sound practice to base so much on any one test, whether the test is measuring student performance or educator performance. Winters, Ritter, Barnett, and Greene (2007) indicate how the use of two assessments in the Arkansas project helped address this issue. Only one of the assessments was used to determine the bonuses; the other was used to compare student gains in the schools with performance pay programs to those in the schools without the programs, thus removing the pay incentive for the second assessment as a potential motivating factor for teachers in either group.
Using multiple measures for evaluations is important for several reasons. It provides a clearer, more complete picture of student achievement. It aligns with teacher unions' position opposing reliance on a single test to determine student achievement. It allows supervisors to recognize effective teacher behaviors that cannot be reflected in test scores (Podgursky & Springer, 2006).
According to a Harvard study, subjective assessments by supervisors, such as principals, should be part of the evaluation process for teachers not only for compensation purposes but also for other reasons. The study found that "subjective principal assessments of teachers predict future student achievement significantly better than teacher experience, education, or actual compensation, though not as well as value-added teacher quality measures" (Jacob & Lefgren, 2005, p. 3).
Finally, a study of the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System demonstrates a strong correlation between teacher effects and subjective evaluation by supervisors (Podgursky & Springer, 2006). This study, and those cited previously, support the concept of evaluation by school principals as a viable component when determining merit and incentive pay. The studies highlight the accuracy, insight, and valid predictability of these evaluations and further illustrate that the preferred approach is to have several different measures or evaluation points on which to base rewards for performance.
Helping High-Need Districts
A primary goal for merit and incentive pay programs is to entice teachers and school leaders to serve in districts with the highest needs. The reality, however, is that many top educators choose to work in more affluent districts because the pay and working conditions are better. As a result, children in high-poverty, low-performing schools may not be getting the best teachers—yet they are the ones who need the best educators the most. In fact, many of these children are taught by instructors who lack a degree in the subject they teach. If districts with high-poverty, low-performing schools cannot attract strong, bonus-worthy educators, their cycle of poor student achievement may never be broken.
Hamilton County, Tennessee, is one locality that took on the effort to use incentives to improve schools and to attract and retain quality teachers, after a report ranked nine of its schools in the bottom 20 of the state's 1,258 elementary and middle schools (Public Education Foundation, 2006). One of several programs that resulted was the Benwood Initiative, created to raise student literacy in the schools by essentially raising the quality of the educators. To bring top-quality educators into the county's urban, poor, and hard-to-staff schools and keep them there, the initiative provides a $10,000 housing loan to teachers who will purchase homes in neighborhoods near the schools. After a teacher has lived five years in his or her house, the loan is forgiven. The initiative also includes retention, recruitment, and team bonuses that are determined by student performance gains measured according to Tennessee's statewide accountability program.
Through funding from local foundations, implementation by the Hamilton County Board of Education, and buy-in from the local teacher union, the Benwood Initiative has produced positive results. The Public Education Foundation (2006) reports, "The schools have become dynamic institutions whose teachers report high levels of job satisfaction. Teacher turnover rates have dropped, and principals receive many applicants for every job opening" (p. 1). The value of these improvements can also be seen in student achievement gains; for example, the percentage of 3rd graders scoring proficient or advanced in reading rose from 53 to 74 percent between 2003 and 2005 (Public Education Foundation, 2006).
Programs and Proposals
As more and more states and school districts set up their own initiatives, new programs and proposals are providing opportunities, resources, and assistance to attract high-quality teachers through incentive pay. The U.S. Department of Education's Teacher Incentive Fund supports performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals serving in high-need school districts. This program has awarded more than 30 grants to states, school districts, and educational agencies in the country, to assist in finding teachers and effective leaders for hard-to-staff schools. The program rewards teachers and principals for increases in student achievement and creates sustainable performance-based compensation systems. Gains in student academic achievement, as well as classroom evaluations conducted several times during each school year, are among the factors that may be used in developing the compensation systems. The program also provides other rewards and opportunities for educators to take on additional responsibilities and leadership roles.
The overarching goal is to increase the number of effective teachers teaching poor, minority, and disadvantaged students in hard-to-staff subjects. The program received $99 million in federal funding for the 2007 fiscal year.
Administered by the National Center for Excellence in Teaching and partially funded by private money, the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) is another program that includes pay bonuses, among other incentives, to attract and retain qualified educators to the profession. TAP comprises four components: multiple career paths; ongoing, applied professional growth; individually focused accountability; and performance-based compensation. Currently, more than 180 U.S. schools are in the process of implementing TAP reforms, and the program credits its ability to recruit talented teachers as a reason for its adoption in large urban school districts like Philadelphia (National Institute for Excellence in Teaching, 2007). (More on Philadelphia's Principal and Teacher Incentive Fund Project.)
The TAP model provides opportunities for increased teacher collaboration and pay bonuses that recognize a teacher's knowledge, skills, and effect on student achievement gains, but its greatest appeal may be that it gives teachers a path to career and financial growth without forcing them to leave the classroom to become administrators or leave the profession altogether. The components of TAP, including the opportunity for professional advancement along a teacher career ladder, form the basis of the state-level incentive initiative currently underway in Minnesota. (More on Minnesota's Q Comp.)
In addition to the backing provided by national-level programs like those described here, the city of Denver, where voters approved a $25 million annual tax increase to fund the new teacher compensation system, offers an example of a community willing to financially support incentive programs. (More on Denver's ProComp.)
Conclusion
Across the United States, schools, states, and policymakers at all levels are seeking to attract effective educators. This pursuit is especially critical in high-need, hard-to-staff school districts serving low-performing kids. To meet the challenge and reward educators by recognizing their skills, talents, and achievements, many schools and states are reconsidering the traditional teacher pay model based on years of experience and education level and are borrowing from the business world in offering incentives. Various aspects of merit and incentive pay programs are gaining traction and helping to relieve concerns over failed experiments with incentives in the past. ASCD believes the implementation of successful programs—that is, those that structure incentives with input from teachers or teacher representatives, determine rewards on the basis of student growth evaluated throughout the year instead of scores from a single test, place the best educators in the highest-need districts, and reward educators for professional improvement through fulfillment of additional duties or acquisition of new skills—coupled with adequate financial support can lead to improved student achievement.
Philadelphia's Principal and Teacher Incentive Fund Project
In 2007, the School District of Philadelphia began implementation of an incentive program that provides teachers and principals with bonuses based on evidence of student growth, and offers career advancement opportunities leading to salary increases. The program is currently available in five of the city's public charter schools, and the Center for Educator Compensation Reform (n.d.) reports that the district plans to expand the program in the fall to include 20 high-need urban elementary schools serving approximately 12,000 students. The U.S. Department of Education (n.d.), which awarded the program a $20.5 million Teacher Incentive Fund grant to be used over five years, indicates that "leaders from the School District of Philadelphia's administration and from the two unions representing all Philadelphia teachers and principals have designed the pilot and will oversee its implementation" (para. 13).
To determine eligibility for the teacher and principal bonuses, the Philadelphia program employs a combination of tools, including objective, standards-based observations and the Pennsylvania Value-Added Assessment System, which allows for the projection of student growth based on the analysis of data from previous years. Opportunities for career advancement, such as moving from teacher to mentor or master teacher, are provided through the district's use of the Teacher Advancement Program. Like many districts around the country, the School District of Philadelphia has partnered with the National Institute for Excellence in Teaching to implement that program in order to keep educators moving up in the profession rather than out of it.
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Minnesota's Q Comp
In 2005, the Minnesota state legislature enacted Quality Compensation for Teachers (Q Comp), a voluntary, state-funded incentive program that enables districts to reform their teacher compensation systems. The Minnesota Department of Education (n.d.) reports that 39 of 339 school districts and 21 charter schools received approval to implement the program, with more than 130 school districts indicating they will apply in the coming years. To receive funding, districts, teachers, and local unions collaboratively design a plan that aligns with the five components of the law, which are based on the Teacher Advancement Program, with the addition of an alternative salary schedule requirement. Teachers' evaluations are an integral part of the compensation system, but Minnesota's Q Comp avoids the criticism that favoritism can influence evaluations (and, consequently, bonuses) by requiring that the review process consist of a series of objective evaluations carried out by a team of evaluators. According to the Minnesota Department of Education, districts approved to implement Q Comp receive an additional $260 per pupil to fund the incentives.
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Denver's ProComp
Since 2005, Denver Public Schools has used its Professional Compensation System for Teachers, better known as ProComp, to reward teachers and student service professionals for their impact on student achievement or their efforts to enhance their professional skills and knowledge. The plan allows educators to earn increasing salaries until they retire, thus avoiding salary plateaus for veterans.
ProComp, which was hammered out between the Denver Public Schools and the Denver Classroom Teachers Association, has enjoyed considerable support in its first several years of operation. The program is built on four major components: meeting targeted increases in student achievement; receiving satisfactory professional evaluations; improving professional knowledge and skills; and working in hard-to-serve or hard-to-staff schools.
One provision of ProComp directly ties math and language arts teacher compensation to student scores on tests in the Colorado Student Assessment Program, awarding a bonus for student success or withdrawing a bonus the following year if students fall below the norm.
Teachers can also earn bonuses for teaching in "distinguished schools" (designated on such bases as academic achievement and high attendance rates); earning a satisfactory rating on three-year evaluations (experienced teachers) or yearly evaluations for three years (probationary teachers); accumulating at least one unit of professional development credit annually, earning an advanced degree, or gaining National Board certification; pursuing professional growth through their own initiative; or teaching in schools considered hard to serve (usually characterized by location in poor neighborhoods, with high percentages of ELL students or students on free or reduced-price lunch programs) or filling hard-to-staff positions (e.g., special education teachers and occupational therapists).
After collecting two full years of data on student achievement, Brad Jupp, senior academic policy advisor in the Denver Public Schools superintendent's office, tells ASCD: "Teachers' worst fears that the new pay system would be divisive, that it would motivate teachers to cheat on standardized tests, that it would break down collegiality, or diminish the status of the principal as instructional leader—these didn't happen. Instead, the best practices that we want teachers to use in the classroom—setting academic goals, reflecting on instructional practices, and collaborating with the principal on student learning—those are what teachers are now doing."
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References
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http://heartland.temp.siteexecutive.com/pdf/20772.pdf
Center for Educator Compensation Reform. (n.d.). Teacher Incentive Fund grantee profiles: Philadelphia Teacher and Principal Incentive Project. Retrieved February 25, 2008, from http://www.cecr.ed.gov/initiatives/profiles/phillyIncentive.cfm
Figlio, D. N., & Kenny, L. W. (2007, June). Individual teacher incentives and student performance. Journal of Public Economics, 91(5–6), pp. 901–914.
Honawar, V. (2007, October 24). N.Y.C. unveils merit-pay plan for teachers in high-need schools. Education Week, 27(9).
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